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e consider an extension of Lan-
chester’s models of conflict by
studying the effect of instanta-
neous, global reductions in effectiveness to
include changes in the underlying process.
We apply this extension to a hypothetical
scenario based on the battle of Iwo Jima and
discuss implications for networked forces.
INTRODUCTION
Deterministic equations of armed con-
flict, first introduced by Lanchester in 1916,
are a simple yet useful analytical tool for
analyzing conflict between two opposing
forces (Lanchester 1916). Lanchester’s model
of armed conflict is studied by military ser-
vices throughout the world. The aspects of
the Lanchester’s equations that are attrac-
tive for analysis include:
• Simplicity: Lanchester’s model distills
combat into a state variable and a single
effectiveness parameter.
• Transparency: Lanchester’s model is eas-
ily explained and readily understood,
even by those with no background in
mathematics.
• Easy implementation: Lanchester’s model
has compact solutions for the terminal
conditions of a battle. If a trace of the
battle is desired, various methods may
be used to obtain a time-dependent
solution. Nonlinear extensions, such as
reinforcements, may be analyzed ade-
quately in most applications with dif-
ference equations.
Lanchester Models
Generalized conflict model. In their most
general form, differential equation models
of armed conflict involving two forces,








• B, R are state variables describing the
number of combatants currently fighting
for Blue and Red, respectively.
• gB; gR are functions, measuring the
expected number of fighters on the oppo-
site side attired by Blue and Red for an
infinitesimal time period, respectively.
We review some choices for g), which
lead to Lanchester models.








These are the equations governing com-
bat using aimed fire. A useful technique is to
















where B0, R0 represent the initial values of
the Blue and Red forces, respectively. This
equation says that the relationship between
the square of the losses in any fixed time
period is equal to the inverse ratio of the ef-
fectiveness parameters. It is for this reason
the aimed fire law is commonly referred to
as Lanchester’s Square Law. As the equations
model conflict between military forces, we
restrict our analysis to the nonnegative real
numbers.
Equations (3) lead to the victory condi-
tion for blue; let Bf, Rf denote the stopping
value of B, R respectively. The stopping
value includes the idea that cases in which
forces fight ‘‘to the finish,’’ such as the
Greeks at Thermopile, US Army at Custer’s
Last Stand, and the Japanese army at Iwo
Jima, are memorable because they are rare;
most forces have ‘‘breakpoints’’ at which
they will cease fighting and either with-















Blue will have achieved victory in the
sense that he will have inflicted sufficient
casualties to reach Red’s ‘‘breakpoint’’
while sustaining no more than his allow-
able casualties.
Finally, Equations (4) may be solved,
see Washburn and Kress (2009) in closed














































































These equations govern combat using area
fire. They assume that each soldier on the Red
and Blue sides is shooting an ‘‘area’’ weapon,
and that the effectiveness of the weapon is de-
pendent both on the rate of fire (number of
shooters) and target density, therefore the term
BR appears in both equations
Equations (6) may be similarly integrated







Contrasting with (3), these equations are
commonly referred to as Lanchester’s linear








Mixed effects. Deitchman (1962) proposed a mixed
model of combat to describe an ‘ambush’ case
where a surprised defender uses area fire against

















5bR R02Rt½ : (10)
Are Lanchester Models the Correct
Approach for Networked Combat?
Before modifying Lanchester Models to con-
sider cases motivated by network effects, we
pause to ask if this is the right thing to be do-
ing in the first place. Lanchester square models
are supported by Engel (1954) followed by a
Samz (1971) analysis of the Battle of Iwo Jima.
Other models have been used to fit the same
data, notably the Log-Linear model (see Hartley
2001). Hartley concludes that ‘‘the fits (of the
Square Law vs. Log-Linear model) are compara-
ble, but neither fit is exceptionally good.’’
By using simple Lanchester models to ana-
lyze a complex situation like combat, now made
more complex with the introduction of con-
founding issues such as a network, we seek to
create a model that is not necessarily predictive,
but rather useful for evaluating alternatives.
The contributions of our effort are:
• To provide an example of how network ef-
fects may be incorporated into deterministic
models of combat.
• To provide a fast, transparent model to use
for verifying complex simulation models.
In short, we seek to incorporate ideas
about the quality and resilience of the network
with ideas about the size and effectiveness
of the fighting force in order to put network




We explore modifications to understand the
effect that a single, discontinuous shock would
have to one side’s (Blue’s) effectiveness. This
shock is a global reduction in effectiveness,
and although it may come from several different
sources, the scenario we have in mind is dam-
age to the network in a highly connected force.
While Blue’s network is in operation, he has ef-
fectiveness function gBN. Blue’s single network
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is subject to a single, irrevocable ‘‘shock’’ (deg-
radation to include failure) at time t*.
Adjustments to Lanchester models have
been proposed before, notably by Bracken
(2001), who introduces d and 1/d parameters
to indicate the advantage (disadvantage) to the
attacker (defender) in the Ardennes Campaign,
where the roles of attacker and defender
changed during the engagement.
Approach
We take advantage of the property that
our proposed choices for g) lead to time-
independent solutions; therefore we may solve
for B* or R*, the force level on either side associ-
ated with the time of network loss. Once any
of the three * parameters is known, the others
may be recovered directly. In all cases our












In this context, B*(R*) is the Blue (Red) force
level when the instantaneous transition from
gBN, representing a networked force, occurs to
gB, representing a nonnetworked force, and
Blue still meeting his victory condition. We as-
sume in all cases that the following inequality
holds:
gBNðt jBÞ$ gBðt jBÞ;
meaning that Blue is more effective before the
shock than after.
By definition, B* is restricted to be between
B0 and Bf, however we will see that it is possi-
ble to solve for values outside of this range.
We understand that values of B* . B0 mean
that Blue would have met its victory condition
without the network, i.e., it could fail in the
first instant of the battle. Similarly, values of
B* , Bf or undefined indicate that Blue will
fail to meet its victory condition with an ‘‘in-
vulnerable’’ network. An algebraic proof for
the Aimed Fire/Aimed Fire case is presented
in the Appendix.
We wish to understand how long Blue’s
network must stay in operation to achieve a
commander’s desired outcome. To this end we
treat t* deterministically as the latest time that
the network may be lost and still avoid Blue de-
feat, in the sense of (4); future work will treat
it more properly as a random variable. Suppose
that a commander knows the initial forces, B0,
R0 and either knows or assumes breakpoints,
Bf, Rf. He also knows gBN; gB; gR. He does not
know how long his network needs to remain
in operation to achieve these aims; solving for
t* informs this question.
Shock Action
There are two ways that a shock may change
Blue’s force, assuming that he is using aimed
fire initially. A shock may simply change (re-
duce) the effectiveness of his aimed fire while
he continues to employ aimed fire. Alternately,
the shock may cause him to switch from aimed
fire to area fire, fundamentally changing the
dynamics of combat.
We assume in all cases that Red employs
Aimed fire, and is invulnerable to a similar
shock.
Aimed Fire/ Aimed Fire Shocks
In this section, we consider the case where
a shock to Blue’s network occurs and he con-
tinues to use aimed fire. Lanchester’s model in-












These equations may be considered to be
two serial instances of Lanchester’s original
model, where the state of the combatants, Bt*,
Rt* at t
*, the time the network is shocked, be-
come the initial conditions to the nonnetworked
battle.
Let B*, R* denote the force level on each side
at the moment the network fails. We may solve
for B* by applying equation (3),
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Once B* is determined, equation (5) may be
used to solve implicitly for t*.
Aimed Fire/ Area Fire Shocks
In this section, we consider the case where
the loss of Blue’s network causes him to shift
from aimed fire to area fire. This changes not
only the parameters, but also the functional












We take advantage of the serial nature of






















































We may now use our solution for R* to solve
for B* and t*.
The Network Loss Function
We do not specify the mechanism by
which the network is disabled. We sidestep
this fundamental issue by treating the time
of network loss, t*, deterministically, as an un-
known quantity that may be solved for from
other model parameters, or as a known (or pre-
sumed) quantity.
Although we do not specify a mathematical
form for network loss, we do have some intui-
tion about it. First, if the threat to the network
is an asymmetric one—to include cyberattacks
but also physical ones like RF Jamming or Elec-
tromagnetic Pulse (EMP), the loss of the network
may not be tied to a certain phase in hostilities.
Secondly, if we know the distribution time of
the shock, we may compute the probability of
victory for Blue.
Great care should be taken in modeling the
time of network loss, t*.
DERIVATION OF EFFECTIVENESS
PARAMETERS, b)
Some discussion is required on the deriva-
tion of parameters. In military applications,
these parameters typically come from data
analysis or expert opinion. Expert opinion is
adequate if the terminal conditions of the en-
gagement are the focus of analysis because, as
seen in equations (4), (7), (10) the effectiveness
ratio is the key metric and statements such as
‘‘we expect that Red is 75% as capable as Blue’’
have meaning. We present below an alter-
nate, engineering approach to the Lanchester
parameters.
Aimed Fire
Consider a force of B Blue troops, each of
whom are using aimed fire to engage some
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number of Red troops. Each individual blue
soldier has some firing rate, h, and his weapon
has some lethality, pkilljhit, and some probability
of hit, phit. We ‘‘roll these up’’ into a single pa-
rameter b by
b5hpkilljhitphit
Now consider a large force and a single
‘‘snapshot’’ in time. The expected number of ca-
sualties inflicted on the opposing side during
some small interval h is:
E½kðhÞ5h pkilljhitphitBh5bBh (15)
Taking limits yields (2).
Network Loss on Aimed Fire
Using Equation (15) as a guide, we may un-
derstand how the loss of a network may affect
Blue’s effectiveness parameter. Loss of the net-
work may lower phit because of lower quality or
quantity of targeting data. It may also reduce
h due to supply chain or targeting difficulties.
Degradation Effects on Aimed Fire
As the quality of targeting data decreases,
the error associated with targeting increases.
We present some analysis to show how the tran-
sition between aimed and area fire occurs.
Although error distributions are specific
to the case being studied, in general, suppose
that the impact distribution about an aimpoint
X0, Y0 is multivariate normal, see Grimmett
and Stirzaker (2001). Where the Y variable refers
to ‘‘Range Error,’’ and the X term refers to ‘‘azi-
muth error.’’ The distribution of points is then:





















In the special case where the errors are
equal and uncorrelated; sX5sY5s; r5 0, we
say that the errors are circularly distributed and
PrfR, rg5 12 e2 12 rsð Þ
2
: (16)
A common metric for targeting accuracy is
the Circular Error Probable (CEP), defined as
the radius that encloses 50% of rounds fired.







Equation (16) gives us some intuition as to
how the loss of targeting data actually affects
the Lanchester parameters. Figure 1 demon-
strates the reduction in effectiveness as CEP
increases.
Area Fire
Similarly, we may consider the same force
of B troops using area fire. The situation here
is slightly more complicated because we have
to assume a finite area that the blue force
is firing into. Again, each individual soldier
has some firing rate h, his weapon has some
lethality, pkilljhit. A simple but useful model
compares a lethal area to the total area of
regard. We denote the lethal area per muni-
tion as AL and the total area as AT. Follow-





Choosing between Aimed and Area fires. It is possi-
ble, likely even, that a Commander, losing a net-
work, needs to decide between employing his
now degraded weapons as area fire or aimed





he should prefer area fire.
ANALYZING THE BATTLE OF IWO
JIMA WITH A NETWORKED FORCE
We now take the model developed earlier
and apply it to an historical scenario with one
minor change. We consider the Battle of Iwo
Jima (1945), with the Blue (US) side having ac-
cess to a networked force. The network enables
both communication between engaged units, as
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well as communication with unmanned systems,
which we credit the Blue side with having. The
Blue network has an (unspecified) vulnerability
which will cause it to be taken out of action at
time t*, with no possibility of repair.
Before considering the new model, we re-
view the original battle.
Analysis of the Battle of Iwo Jima
(1945)
Engel (1954), and Samz (1971) modify equa-








where P(t) is the pulsed arrival of Blue troops
ashore. Their parameters are:
bB5 :0106
bR5 :0544 R05 21;500
Pð0Þ5 54;000 Pð2Þ5 6;000 Pð5Þ5 13;000:
Casualtiesa for the Blue (US) side were 20,860,
for a casualty rate of 28%. Iwo Jima was a true
‘‘fight to the finish’’ for the Japanese, whose ca-
sualty rate was 100%. A time trace of this battle
is shown in Figure 2.
Iwo Jima, Networked (Present Day)
Suppose that a commander was to refight
the battle of Iwo Jima with a modern, network
enabled force. This commander believes his
network invulnerable, and that his network ne-
gates the adversary’s advantage for being ‘‘dug
in.’’ Should he lose his networked advantage,
his effectiveness reverts to the historical value.
Furthermore, he determines that his tolerance
for casualties is 10%. From Equation (17), he es-
timates his total landing force should be approx-
imately 56,000 troops, which we distribute
similarly to the 1945 commander. The parame-
ters are:
bR5 :0544 R05 21;500
bBN5 :0544 bB5 :0106
Pð0Þ5 40;000 Pð2Þ5 5;000 Pð5Þ5 11;000
Figure 1. Reduction in b as a function of Circular Error Probable (CEP). As CEP increases, b diminishes super-
exponentially.
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It is important to note that the reinforcement
schedule for Iwo Jima and the analyses of
the battle are time based, not condition based.
Condition-based reinforcement rules may lead
to nonmonotone results (see Dewar et al. 1996).
We wish to know what the effect of loss
of the network is on the Blue casualty rate. We
may do so by analyzing the Blue casualties at
the end of the battle as a function of t* (Figure 3).
For instance, compare the time trace of the
battle in Figure 2 with the time trace in Figure
4, which is the battle with t* ¼ 3. In the modified
battle, Blue losses are approximately $23,000$
(41%) as opposed to his anticipated losses of
5,600, or 10%. Whereas Blue’s network-based
planning led him to arrive with a more lethal—
and therefore, smaller—force, the unanticipated
failure of his network led him to higher casual-
ties than the original battle. At this point, we
would have to ask if Blue would continue to
fight with such a high proportion of his force
lost, or if he would withdraw.
The takeaway for both analysts and deci-
sion makers from Figure 1 is that planning for
an operation without adequately appreciating the
fragility of the network may lead to unexpected—
and negative—results. As a final exercise, we wish
to explore the relationship between relative nu-
merical strength and time of network loss, t*. This
both shows the flexibility of this approach as well
as provides another illustration (see Figure 5).
CONCLUSION
This article is not an answer so much as
a place to begin putting analysis to this impor-
tant issue. We have:
• Demonstrated an analytical approach to in-
corporating the effects of network degrada-
tion in a kinetic battle.
• Shown, using a well-established historical
context, that planning for combat using a net-
worked force without planning for failure of
the network may lead to disaster.
• Demonstrated how a Service may compare
the value of network reliability with increased
combat capability.
In this model, we have treated the failure of
the network as a fixed event within a determin-
istic Lanchester model. We have also treated
Figure 2. Time trace of the Battle of Iwo Jima, based on Engel’s analysis of the battle. The three spikes in the Blue
force level represent the three waves of landings on the Island.
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Figure 4. Time trace of modified battle of Iwo Jima with t*¼ 3$. The shock effect, changing Blue’s effectiveness, is
seen as an inflection point on Red’s force level.
Figure 3. Blue’s casualty rate (Red fights to the finish) as a function of the time of network loss, t* in the modern
Iwo Jima scenario, planned for 10% casualties with an invulnerable network. Loss of the network early in the bat-
tle has a dramatic effect on Blue’s casualty rate.
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network failure as an independent event from
the kinetic battle.
Future work will be to relax both of these
constraints, specifically by treating the effective-
ness parameters, bB, bR as functions instead of
constants. A similar idea has been used by
Artelli and Deckro (2008) to introduce fatigue
into a Lanchester-like battle.
NOTES
a Engel counts a casualty for the Blue side as
being ‘‘out of action,’’ which includes wounded
as well as killed.
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF B*
PROPERTIES FOR AIMED FIRE CASE
Theorem. If Equation (12) results in B$B0,
Blue may achieve their desired victory condi-
tion or better without the network.
Proof. Recalling the victory condition (4),















The victory condition may be rewritten as:
bBðB202B2f Þ2bRðR202R2f Þ$ 0:














Simplifying and regrouping results in:
bBðB202B2Þ$bBNðB202B2Þ
However, because B$B0 and we are re-
stricted to being nonnegative, B202B
2
# 0. Mul-
tiplying by 21, we see are left with bB#bBN,
which is true by definition and the proof is
complete.
Theorem. If the formula for B* returns an
imaginary number, the victory conditions Bf, Rf
are not achievable with an invulnerable network
Proof. Examining Equation (12), we see that
B* is imaginary iif
bRðR202R2f Þ.bBNB202bBB2f ;






For any allowable (nonnegative) choice of B*.
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